Why I Am Not a Hedonist: an answer to Mill

A hedonist is someone who devotes their life to pleasure or may even maintain that pleasure is the highest good for any and all human beings. The philosopher John Stuart Mill espoused hedonism and famously rebutted its critics thus:

Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure—no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit—they designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened; and modern holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assailants.

When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. … But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect; of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. (Utilitarianism, Ch.2)

Thus, Mill distinguished “higher” from  “lower” pleasures and argued that inclusion of the former in the life of pleasure rescues hedonism from the critic’s presumption that only the latter count. Indeed, Mill went on to claim that a proper hedonist prefers the former to the latter kind of pleasure when offered the choice.

Nevertheless Mill’s argument is still found wanting by the critic because it quite begs the question of what makes the proper hedonist “proper.” Merely calling someone who prefers the “lower” pleasures a “fool,” as Mill does, is hardly an argument. And it is entirely tendentious even to use the designations of “higher” and “lower” to begin with. Mill is merely displaying his own prejudices.

But this only means that Mill worked too hard to refute his critic, since he might simply have bitten the bullet and acknowledged that pleasure is where you find it.

I myself, however, have a different objection to hedonism. I offer a partially linguistic argument. Suppose the hedonist were to recommend that you pursue a life of pleasure. What does this bring to mind? I would say: devoting yourself to indulging in backrubs, eating scrumptious foods (it need not be McDonald’s but could be a gourmet’s delight, or exclusively “natural” fare, etc.), embarking on sexual adventures, sailing the South Seas in your yacht, and so forth. It certainly does not bring to mind such things as: reading the great works of literature, pursuing a career in science or medicine, creating art or music, taking on the cause of exploited animals.

            Now Mill might very well rejoin: “Surely those latter can generate pleasure, and pleasure that is both more extreme and more sublime than that of the former indulgences.” Furthermore he could argue that: ‘”If they didn’t, people would not go to the trouble of pursuing them!”

            But I can grant all that and still maintain that Mill’s argument falls short. For the purpose of the hedonistic life, and what the hedonist would enjoin us to do, is to generate pleasure for oneself, whereas the purpose of the other pursuits I listed is to do those things: read, paint, compose, heal the sick, seek knowledge, rescue animals. Thus, if I were urging you to devote yourself to your artistic vocation, or to relieving human or animal suffering, and even though I might believe such a life would be most rewarding for you, I would hardly couch my recommendation in the language of hedonism and advise you to cultivate pleasure as your life’s goal! The hedonist advises getting backrubs etc. as a means to the end of obtaining pleasure; the nonhedonist, contrariwise, advises devoting yourself to painting, or to human or animal welfare, as the end, the good, and whatever pleasure is involved serves as means, a concession to human motivation’s requirement of some degree of satisfaction of its desires. “Follow your bliss” can thus mean for the sake of bliss (as end: this is hedonism) or for the sake of something other than bliss (as means: this is not hedonism), since whatever gives you bliss is what you will likely be most motivated to do and hence best at doing.

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